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1 Introduction 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) can lower their global tax bill by shifting their earnings from 
affiliates in high-tax countries to those in low-tax countries—a phenomenon known as ‘profit 
shifting’. In a remarkable consensus, international organizations agree that profit shifting is a 
particular problem in developing countries, which lack institutional capacity and rely heavily on 
corporate tax revenue.1 However, credible profit-shifting estimates for developing countries are in 
short supply, leaving room for much speculation.2  
Globally, policy makers are ready to act. Following a G20-mandated report by the OECD, more 
than 110 jurisdictions have embraced the OECD’s recommended ‘action points’ on how to curb 
profit shifting. While popular among governments, critics maintain that these action points are 
insufficient and particularly insufficient in developing country settings.3 In this paper, I contribute 
to the existing body of knowledge in two ways. First, I provide direct systematic evidence of profit 
shifting in a developing country. Second, I evaluate the effect of an OECD-recommended reform 
in a developing country. 
One channel of profit shifting is transfer mispricing. That is, firms can reduce their tax bill by 
applying a high price on items flowing from affiliates in low-tax countries to affiliates in high-tax 
countries, and vice versa. This erodes the profits in the high-tax affiliate, which is paying the high 
price, but equally increases the profits in the low-tax affiliate, which is receiving the high price. 
Legally firms are supposed to use ‘arm’s-length pricing’ when transacting internally. That is, firms 
should set prices internally ‘as if’ they were trading with an external party. However, following the 
standard Allingham–Sandmo model (1972), firms may choose to deviate from arm’s-length pricing 
absent frequent audits. Furthermore, even when audited, the OECD admits that ‘transfer pricing 
is not an exact science’ (OECD 2010: 2) and this uncertainty leaves room for firms to produce 
convincing arm’s-length price benchmarks in their favour. All in all, the actual enforcement of 
arm’s-length pricing requires substantial administrative resources and a common hypothesis is that 
tax authorities in developing countries do not have these resources. The main contribution of this 
paper is to test this hypothesis by providing direct systematic evidence of transfer mispricing in a 
developing country. This has not previously been possible due to data constraints.  
Using transactional data, I can directly test for transfer mispricing. I obtain access to a newly 
constructed, confidential, administrative-level, customs data-set covering all imports of goods to 
South Africa in the period from 2011 to 2015. The data is disaggregated at the country-firm-
relationship-product-year level, which allows me to precisely estimate the arm’s-length price of 
each transaction. I then compare the unit price on related (intra-firm) transactions to the estimated 
arm’s-length price. I find that the estimated deviation from arm’s-length pricing systematically 
moves in accordance with the tax incentives to manipulate transfer prices. This is interpreted as 
strong evidence of firms engaging in tax-motivated transfer mispricing. Across all specifications, I 
find evidence that related imports from low-tax countries are overpriced by at least 8 per cent 
                                                 
1 See e.g. UNCTAD (2015) and IMF (2015). 
2 This lack of evidence has led to concerns among some economists who fear that the relevance of profit shifting in 
the development agenda may be overrated (Forstater 2015; Johannesen and Pirttilä 2016). 
3 See e.g. The Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation (ICRICT): ‘by avoiding 
any rethinking of the separate entity system and creating even more complexity within the current faulty framework, 
the BEPS [Base Erosion and Profit Shifting] initiative has amounted to pouring new wine into old wineskins’ (ICRICT 
2015: 10) 
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compared to the estimated arm’s-length price. This translates into a semi-elasticity with respect to 
the tax differential of 0.5, implying that the price wedge to the arm’s-length price increases by 0.5 
per cent if the tax differential to the partner country increases by 1 percentage point. The resulting 
tax loss as a share of total corporate tax revenue is 0.5 per cent. 
Using the same methodology, I then move on to investigate the effects of an OECD-
recommended transfer-price reform. In April 2012, South Africa introduced a number of measures 
aimed at limiting transfer mispricing through increased documentational requirements and audit 
discretion. These legislative changes were based on OECD recommendations. I find that this 
reform did seem to limit transfer mispricing in 2012–14 but that transfer price manipulation 
returned to its original level in 2015. One possible explanation of this pattern is that the immediate 
effect of the reform was primarily an (unjustified) expectation of highly increased audit capabilities 
in the tax administration. As firms experienced no actual change in enforcement efforts, the 
transfer mispricing returned to its initial level. This conclusion is not surprising: granting more 
information and discretion to the tax authority will not result in higher tax compliance if there is 
no increase in tax enforcement resources and capabilities (see e.g. Pomeranz 2015 for a similar 
discussion on VAT). 
Contrary to common belief, I do not find that firms in South Africa are more aggressive in their 
transfer mispricing compared to firms operating in developed countries. I do a systematic review 
of the seven prior studies of transfer mispricing in Denmark (Cristea and Nguyen 2016); France 
(Vicard 2014; Davies et al. 2018); the United States (Clausing 2003; Bernard et al. 2006; Flaaen 
2017) and the United Kingdom (Liu et al. 2017). I find that the estimated semi-elasticity of transfer 
mispricing with respect to the tax differential varies significantly across and even within studies. 
The mean estimated semi-elasticity across studies is 1.3 but drops to 0.4 when restricting the 
sample of estimates to those accounting for firm and product fixed effects. The estimated semi-
elasticity in South Africa is hence completely on par with what has been observed in advanced 
economies. In Figure 1, I plot the estimated tax loss of (one directional) transfer mispricing of 
goods in prior studies. The average estimated tax loss is just below 1 per cent and the median tax 
loss is 0.4 per cent, which is completely on par with the estimated tax loss in South Africa. I 
conclude that transfer mispricing of goods in South Africa is not different from transfer mispricing 
in developed countries, both in terms of the responsiveness to tax incentives and the resulting tax 
loss.  
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Figure 1: Estimated tax loss of transfer mispricing of goods (% of corporate tax receipts) 
 
 
Note: The graph shows the estimated tax loss caused by transfer mispricing of goods in prior studies as a share 
of total corporate tax receipts. The tax loss is based on one direction of trade (imports or exports) in all studies 
but Vicard (2015) where the average across imports and exports is used. See section 7 for a full description. 
Source: Author’s own literature review (see online appendix). 
Tax authorities can use the econometric method applied in this paper as an automated digital 
flagging system. Such a system would alert tax authorities when firms are systematically divergent 
in their external and internal price-setting behaviour. For many governments, the data is already 
there and used when firms are audited. The next natural development is to use the full data source 
in an automated flagging model to guide the selection of firms for audits. This would be a feasible, 
low-cost, and easily implemented digital intervention.4 The cost of doing this is in the thousands 
of dollars while the potential tax gain is in the tens of millions of dollars. Such an intervention is 
an example of the potential for digital tax enforcement, which the OECD (2016a) and the IMF 
(2017) are promoting. To my knowledge, no tax authority has yet implemented such a system. 
However, the fact that I (and others) find systematic mispricing using this methodology implies 
that there should be some scope to pursue this further.  
The paper will proceed as follows. In Section 2, I give an overview of the previous literature. In 
Section 3, I describe the South African context and transfer pricing legislation. Section 4 gives a 
brief theoretical motivation. Section 5 presents the data used, the identification strategy, and the 
main empirical results. Section 6 evaluates the transfer pricing reform that took place in 2012. 
Section 7 presents a systematic review of prior transfer mispricing estimates and compares these 
estimates to the South African case. Finally, I conclude and discuss the findings in Section 7.  
                                                 
4 It took two weeks for me to set this up in South Africa.  
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2 Related literature on profit shifting 
Most profit-shifting studies rely on so-called ‘indirect evidence’, which relates the taxable profits 
of each subsidiary to its inputs of labour and capital and the tax incentive to shift profits.5 This 
method is, however, also the subject of much criticism. The main criticism is that when simply 
investigating patterns in profitability, one might be capturing other ‘real’ responses to tax incentives 
or tax avoidance not related to profit shifting.6 In a broader sense, the indirect evidence approach 
can be unsatisfactory, as the method does not identify specific profit-shifting channels. This study 
addresses such critique by directly comparing the prices that multinationals apply to internal and 
external transactions. 
A further critique of past profit-shifting studies—especially relevant in developing country 
settings—is the common use of low-coverage proprietary databases. In their G20-mandated report 
on profit-shifting measurement, the OECD criticizes the use of proprietary databases where data 
quality and coverage are often poor, particularly outside of the EU and in developing countries 
(OECD 2015). The OECD thus advocates the use of tax-administrative micro-data in profit-
shifting studies, which has previously not been possible in developing countries. Unlike previous 
work, this study follows the OECD recommendation by using tax-administrative data. 
This paper contributes to the scarce literature on ‘direct’ evidence of transfer mispricing.7 In fact, 
this is the first study applying this direct identification strategy outside the context of the US, UK, 
France, and Denmark. Swenson (2001) and Clausing (2003) introduced the method by estimating 
the impact of corporate tax rates on US trade price indices aggregated at the industry and country 
level. They both find very large estimates of transfer mispricing, but there is a concern that product 
and firm compositional effects may drive the result. Bernard et al. (2006)8 address this issue by 
using customs data at the firm and product level, allowing them to accurately estimate arm’s-length 
price deviations. Instead of exploiting the full sample of product prices at a country-by-country 
level, Bernard et al. (2006) calculate price wedges between related and unrelated transactions for 
each product group within each MNE. This makes their estimates less comparable to mine. Most 
recently, Davies et al. (2018) investigate transfer mispricing in France using a method directly 
comparable to the one used in this paper, which makes their results a good point of reference for 
this study. Also relying on transaction-level customs data, Vicard (2014), Cristea and Nguyen 
(2016) and Liu et al. (2017) find strong evidence of transfer mispricing in France, Denmark, and 
the UK. They do not, however, observe whether transactions are in fact related but instead 
approximate this using firm ownership data. In section 7, I systematically compare the estimates 
of my study to prior research. I find that transfer mispricing in South Africa is on par with what 
has been observed in prior studies. 
To my knowledge, this is the first paper that uses transaction data to directly test for transfer 
mispricing in a developing country. 
                                                 
5 Hines and Rice (1994) introduced this methodology and it has since been applied in a wealth of papers. See 
Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) or Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) for an overview of the literature. A handful of 
studies have applied this technique in a developing-country setting, see e.g. Crivelli et al. (2015), UNCTAD (2015), 
Reynolds and Wier (2016), Johannesen et al. (2017), and Tørsløv et al. (2018). 
6 See Hines (2014) for a discussion of this. 
7 The notion of ‘direct’ evidence was first coined by Clausing (2003). 
8 Later replicated by Flaaen (2017). 
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3 South African context 
3.1 Economy 
South Africa is an upper-middle-income emerging economy with a gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita of US$5,692 in 2015.9 As a BRICS member with a population of 56 million and Africa’s 
second largest economy, South Africa is seen by many as the most influential economy in Africa. 
Nonetheless, South Africa struggles with issues common to many developing countries in the form 
of rampant inequality (Greenwood 2018), slow growth (Roux 2017), and corruption (Gebrekidan 
and Onishi 2018).  
As is the case with most developing countries, South Africa is fiscally constrained and relies heavily 
on corporate tax receipts. Total tax revenue constituted 25.5 of GDP in 2014–15, which is 
substantially beneath the OECD average of 34 per cent (National Treasury 2016).10 The corporate 
income tax constituted a significant share of 19 per cent of total taxes in 2014/2015, which places 
South Africa on par with the developing country average (UNCTAD 2015; National Treasury 
2016). In comparison, developed countries’ corporate income tax share of total taxes was only 11 
per cent in 2014 (UNCTAD 2015). The South African statutory tax rate on business income is 28 
per cent, which places it slightly above the world average of 24 per cent and far above nearby tax 
havens such as Mauritius and the Seychelles (see KPMG (n.d.). The combination of low overall 
tax receipts, high reliance on corporate tax revenue, and a moderately high corporate tax rate 
warrants extra attention to the issue of profit shifting in South Africa. 
3.2 Transfer price legislation  
Transfer price legislation was first enacted in South Africa in 1995 and requires that tax payers 
follow the arm’s-length principle in their transactions with affiliated foreign parties. This means 
that firms operating in South Africa should set their transfer prices on internal transactions as if 
they were transacting with an external party. Enforcing this principle is fraught with difficulty. 
Some economists have argued that the very idea of one true arm’s-length price is flawed (see e.g. 
Devereux and Vella 2014 or Zucman 2014). The critique of the ‘arm’s-length’ price, however, 
mostly refers to service transactions (such as management fees), where comparable transactions 
are hard to find. In the case of goods transactions, which is the focus of this paper, we actually 
have well-defined product categories (such as ‘bolts’ or ‘carrots’) and we have objective quantities 
that allow us to compute unit prices (which is not the case when transacting in services). The arm’s-
length principle should hence be easier to enforce in the case of goods transactions, where we can 
actually compare the unit price that firms apply to external and internal transactions.  
How is arm’s-length pricing enforced in practice? Following the WTO’s stance on transfer pricing, 
South African tax authorities may require the importer to explain a chosen transfer price whenever 
the importer and exporter are ‘related’ (e.g. through common ownership) and this relation is 
suspected to have impacted the transaction value. In order to avoid a transfer price correction, the 
importer must demonstrate that the chosen transfer price can be justified according to one of the 
following methods:11 
                                                 
9 World Bank (2016) data. 
10 OECD (2016b) data.  
11 SARS (2014) Directive 2, Customs External Directive Method 1 Valuation of Imports  
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1) The transfer price corresponds to the price observed in external comparable unrelated 
transactions (according to articles 2, 3, or 4 of the Method of the WTO Valuation 
Agreement). 
2) The transfer price is calculated by estimating the opportunity costs and gains to each party 
in the transaction. This can be done through methods such as cost-plus pricing, profit split, 
or most commonly the transactional net margin method (according to article 5 of the 
Method of the WTO Valuation Agreement). 
It is clear that the multitude of valuation methods gives the importer a negotiable room of 
acceptable transfer prices—leaving room for tax avoidance. In the case of comparable unrelated 
transactions, the firm can selectively choose which products to include in the comparison. In the 
case of cost-plus pricing both costs and required profit margin can be manipulated by the firm.12 
Finally, the firm might choose to do outright tax evasion and deviate from arm’s-length pricing 
without having any documentation to support the deviation. As described in Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972), a firm’s willingness to engage in tax evasion is a function of the likelihood of audits 
and the penalties involved, both of which are small in the case of transfer pricing. 
If a firm deviates from the ‘objective’ arm’s-length price to ensure a minimal tax bill, this is known 
as ‘tax-motivated transfer mispricing’. Tax-motivated transfer mispricing is the focus of this paper 
and must not be confused with ‘trade misinvoicing’. Trade misinvoicing refers to situations where 
firms commit fraud and falsify information given to the tax authority. In such a case there may not 
be a transfer price, as the firms simply hide all or some of the transaction. As this study exploits 
the information given to tax authorities, for obvious reasons it does not attempt to estimate 
misinvoicing. The following list clarifies the terminology: 13 
• Trade misinvoicing: false documentation on actual price and/or affiliation of transacting 
parties and/or quantities and/or product; 
• Arm’s length price deviation: deviation from arm’s-length pricing, but correct 
documentation supplied on price, affiliation, quantities, and product; 
• Tax-motivated transfer mispricing: intentional deviation from arm’s-length pricing that is 
motivated by tax savings (scope of this study). 
In this paper, I use the terms tax-motivated transfer mispricing and transfer mispricing 
interchangeably. 
  
                                                 
12 Some economists have argued that the very idea of one true arm’s-length price is flawed (see e.g. Zucman 2014). 
Becker and Davies (2014) argue that transfer mispricing should instead be seen as a bargaining game between the tax 
authority and the firm. 
13 Forstater (2018) discusses the conceptual differences in detail. She also discusses the empirical evidence and finds 
that estimates of trade misinvoicing are generally much larger than transfer mispricing, but that the estimates are also 
less credibly identified. 
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4 Theoretical motivation  
Following the broad literature of theoretical models describing the optimal price strategy within 
intra-firm trade, I present an illustrative example that can produce the main predictions related to 
tax-motivated transfer mispricing and tax enforcement.14  
Consider a MNE consisting of two affiliates located in a high-tax country denoted H with tax rate 
τH and a low-tax country denoted L with a lower tax rate τL. Further assume that the low-tax 
affiliate sells q units of goods to the high-tax affiliate at price p. Let ΠH and ΠL denote the 
exogenous taxable income in countries H and L prior to paying the transfer price. The taxable 
profits in the high-tax country will in this case be ΠH-pq while the taxable profits in the low-tax 
country will be ΠL+pq. Any transfer price increase will reduce the taxable profits in the high-tax 
subsidiary but correspondingly increase the taxable profits of the subsidiary in the low-tax country. 
As the after-tax value of profits is higher in the low-tax country, the MNE would absent any 
additional constraints always choose the transfer price p=
ΠH
q
, such that all profits would be shifted 
from the high-tax subsidiary to the low-tax subsidiary. However, the MNE is by law required to 
price the internal sale at the ‘true’ arm’s-length price p
a
 , and any deviation from this is assumed 
to come at a cost. Costs may come in the form of additional documentational requirements, 
potential legal costs, worsened public relations, etc. Efficiency costs may also occur; Nielsen and 
Raimondos-Moller (2008) describe how transfer mispricing strategies may lead to inefficiencies 
within the MNE. For simplicity, I assume that these costs can be approximated by the functional 
form 
β
2
[(p-p
a
)q]
2
, such that the marginal cost of deviating from the arm’s-length price is increasing 
in the size of the deviation, the quantity sold, and a parameter β. An increase in β will, for a given 
arm’s-length price deviation, increase the costs of transfer mispricing and hence reflects 
institutional factors such as the likelihood of audits and the fines related to transfer mispricing. 
The MNE seeks to maximize the sum of after-tax profits across the two countries minus the costs 
of transfer price deviation, which implies that the optimization problem becomes: 
maxwrt p:(ΠH-pq)τH+(ΠL+pq)τL-
β
2
[(p-pa)q]
2 
In an internal optimum, the MNE will choose a transfer price that satisfies the condition: 
τH-τL
β
=(p-pa)q 
As τH>τL the firm will always choose to price the item flowing from the low-tax affiliate to the 
high-tax affiliate above the arm’s-length price p>p
a
. Intuitively, the transfer mispricing (p-p
a
) is 
furthermore increasing in the size of the tax differential (τH-τL), which is the tax saving per dollar 
shifted, and decreasing in the parameter β, which is proportional to the marginal cost of shifting 
one extra dollar. It is important to note that the cost parameter β is endogenous to the policies in 
place in both countries: e.g. strict documentational requirements, advanced audit strategies, or a 
high risk of audit will increase the cost of deviating from the arm’s-length price. The common 
hypothesis is that β is low in a developing country, such that for a given tax incentive arm’s-length 
                                                 
14 More elaborate theoretical discussions can be found in Riedel et al. (2015), Cristea and Nguyen (2016), Davies et al. 
(2018), and Liu et al. (2017). 
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price deviations will be larger in a developing country. The hypothesis of transfer mispricing being 
a larger issue in developing countries is what I test in this paper. 
5 Empirical analysis 
5.1 Data 
Confidential customs data on imported goods is obtained from the South African Revenue Service 
(SARS) and covers the period from 2011 to 2015. The unit of observation is at the firm-product-
relation-country-year level, such that each observation includes a firm identifier, product code, a 
dummy indicating whether the transaction is intra-firm, the country of origin, and the year. Product 
categories are defined according to the Harmonized System (HS) at the 8-digit level. The fact that 
the code is eight digits allows for incredible precision in the product description. One of the most 
traded product categories is for example:  
Product category 4016.95.20:15 
‘Inflatable article of rubberised fabric, with hermetically 
sealed ends, for use as moulds in the manufacture, 
construction or maintenance of concrete pipes, voided 
(cavity) blocks, beams, slabs and structures’ 
The data also includes information on the customs value and the number of units, which allows 
me to calculate the unit price. To remove outliers, I censor observations with unit prices in the top 
99 percentile within each year; this does not, however, impact the results quantitatively nor 
qualitatively. Table 1 shows the aggregate value of imports across years and partner relation. Two 
immediate concerns come to mind when looking at these aggregate values. First, the share of 
related (intra-firm) imports is always below 4 per cent. This share is markedly lower than what has 
been observed across French firms (9.2 per cent, Davies et al. 2018) and US firms (roughly 30 per 
cent, Bernard et al. 2006). This raises the concern of whether related imports are correctly 
registered. Each firm is required by law to denote whether the import is coming from a related 
party, but whether firms are actually filling out the forms correctly is, of course, a question of 
enforcement. I discussed this with tax officials working in the transfer-pricing unit at SARS—they 
did not think that misfiling of information was widespread. As discussed in Section 3.2, 
misclassification of firm relations in internal transactions relates to trade misinvoicing and is 
therefore outside the scope of transfer mispricing. The second concern Table 1 invokes is that of 
overall coverage. Whereas the aggregate value of imports in the years 2011, 2012, 2014, and 2015 
matches the aggregate customs statistics, coverage in 2013 is only 25 per cent. I replicate all results 
censoring 2013. This does not impact the results quantitatively nor qualitatively.  
                                                 
15 Full product codes can be found in SARS (2018). 
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Table 1: Imports to South Africa by year and partner relation 
Year Unrelated imports 
(Bn. Rnd.) 
Related imports 
(Bn. Rnd.) 
Related imports 
 (Share) 
2011 1,005.8 7.2 0.70% 
2012 1,169.6 26.4 2.30% 
2013 238.6 7.5 3.20% 
2014 1,432.1 39.5 2.80% 
2015 1,199.5 38.8 3.20% 
Note: The table shows the distribution of South African imports of goods. ’Related’ denotes a transaction that is 
intra-firm (controlled), i.e. trade between affiliates of the same MNE. 
Source: Author’s calculations using SARS (n.d.) data. 
The customs data is merged with firm financials obtained from corporate tax returns, which are 
also obtained from SARS. Finally, information on global statutory corporate tax rates and macro-
economic variables is obtained from the KPMG (n.d.) Corporate Tax Table and the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank n.d.).  
Figure 1 shows the distribution of partner country corporate tax rates in the customs data. The 
vertical line marks the South African tax rate of 28 per cent, and there is substantial variation on 
both sides of the marker for both related and unrelated imports. Table 2 reports the summary 
statistics, while Appendix Table A1 lists the top 40 import partner countries. 
Figure 2: Distribution of import partner corporate tax rate 
  Figure 2a: Related imports      Figure 2b: Unrelated Imports 
 
  
 
                  
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
Note: The figures show the distribution of import partner corporate tax rates. ‘Related’ denotes a transaction that 
is intra-firm (controlled), i.e. trade between affiliates of the same MNE. The sample period is 2011 to 2015. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on KPMG (n.d.) and SARS (n.d.).
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 Related imports  All imports 
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
 
Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Panel A: Customs 
Log (unit price) 120,301 5.9 1.7 -6.8 17.2 
 
4,914,601 5.6 2.3 -12.1 22.5 
Unit price (1,000 
Rnd.) 
120,301 7.2 176.0 0.0 29,700.0 
 
4,914,602 20.2 4,577.0 0.0 6,190,000.0 
Customs value 
(1,000 Rnd.) 
120,301 993.1 20,400.0 0.0 3,700,000.0 
 
4,914,603 1,026.6 51,600.0 0.0 27,700,000.0 
Statistical quantity 
(1,000 Units) 
120,301 79.5 10,800.0 0.0 2,530,000.0 
 
4,914,604 55.3 5,281.2 0.0 2,930,000.0 
Related party 
dummy 
120,301 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
 
4,914,603 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 
Panel B: Financials – SA importer  
Log (Sales) 71,507 20.6 2.0 10.2 25.8 
 
2,459,574 18.5 2.4 6.4 25.8 
Log (Wage) 71,690 17.9 1.8 9.4 22.3 
 
2,477,314 16.3 2.3 0.0 24.0 
Leverage 22,075 0.2 0.3 0.0 4.6 
 
1,334,794 0.2 0.5 0.0 18.5 
Loss making 106,504 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 
 
4,234,601 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Taxable income 
(Mill. Rand) 
72,998 182.0 748.0 -2,230.0 13,900.0 
 
4,234,602 130.0 831.0 -1,7500.0 31,500.0 
Panel C: Macro data – partner country  
Low tax 120,301 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 
4,914,603 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Corporate tax 117,729 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.6 
 
4,800,978 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.6 
Log (GDP pr. cap.) 119,077 14.5 1.4 5.6 16.7 
 
4,886,696 14.7 1.8 4.4 16.7 
Log (Exchange rate) 105,890 1.6 2.3 -1.0 10.3 
 
4,530,318 1.4 2.0 -1.3 10.3 
Log (Distance) 119,280 9.1 0.3 5.5 9.6 
 
4,827,748 9.1 0.6 5.5 9.7 
Log (Population) 119,077 4.3 1.6 -2.9 7.2 
 
4,886,696 4.7 1.9 -5.3 7.2 
EU dummy 119,211 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 
4,890,506 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 
OECD dummy 119,211 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 
4,890,506 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Haven dummy 119,211 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 
 
4,890,506 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 
Note: The table shows descriptive statistics of the gross sample. The sample period is 2011 to 2015. All 
observations are imports going to South Africa from a foreign country. The table is split across related imports 
(between affiliates) and unrelated. A unit of observation is a firm-relation-origin-product-time quintuble. Unit prices 
are calculated as the transaction value divided by the statistical quantity.  Observations with unit prices in the 
99th percentile are dropped from the sample. Panel A describes the customs data. ‘Customs value’ denotes the 
registered value of the transaction in the customs data. ‘Statistical quantity’ denotes the number of units. ‘Related 
party’ is a dummy variable indicating an internal (controlled) trade between affiliates of the same MNE. Panel B 
describes the financials of the importing firm in South Africa obtained from the South African Corporate Income 
Tax database (SARS n.d.). ‘Sales’ denotes turnover, ‘Wage’ denotes the labour costs, ‘Leverage’ is measured as 
total long-term debt over assets, and ‘Loss making’ is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm incurred a 
loss in the period in scope.  Panel C describes the macro data on the import country of origin. ‘Low tax’ is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the trading partner (import origin) country's corporate tax rate is below the 
South African corporate tax rate of 28 per cent. ‘Corporate tax’ is the corporate statutory tax rate of the import 
country. ‘Haven’ is a dummy indicating whether the the import origin country is a tax haven following the definition 
used in Hines (2010) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on KPMG (n.d.), SARS (n.d.), and World Bank (n.d.). 
5.2 Identification of transfer mispricing 
The great detail in the customs data allows for a direct comparison of the unit price of related and 
unrelated imports. This in turn allows me to estimate the arm’s-length prices and the resulting 
transfer price deviations. If the estimated arm’s-length price deviations systematically move in 
accordance with the tax incentives to manipulate transfer prices, this is taken as evidence of firms 
engaging in strategic transfer mispricing. Table 3 illustrates this approach. Here, I report the 
aggregate averages of (log) unit prices by partner relation and tax level. Column 1 shows that the 
average unit price of related imports is roughly on par (4 per cent higher) with the unit price on 
external imports when imports originate from a high-tax country (defined as a tax rate above the 
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South African tax of 28 per cent). Contrary to this, column 2 shows that the unit price on related 
imports is 57 per cent higher when the import origin is a low-tax country. Based on these aggregate 
numbers, the most plausible estimate of transfer mispricing is the ‘difference-in-difference’ 
estimate, i.e. 57 per cent minus 4 per cent = 53 per cent. This is a first indication that related 
imports from low-tax countries may be overpriced (and by a lot), which is consistent with firms 
manipulating transfer prices (a lot) in order to shift profits to low-tax countries. 
Of course, I am, quite literally, comparing apples and oranges in this simple example. This concern 
can be mitigated by looking at the same difference-in-difference estimate within product groups. 
In Figure 2, I therefore calculate the difference-in-difference estimate within the ten largest 
product groups. That is, the bottom dot in Figure 3 corresponds to the overall difference-in-
difference estimate of 54 per cent, the dot above replicates this estimate but with a sample only 
consisting of plastic articles, and so on. Albeit there is substantial variation in the estimates across 
different product categories, seven out of ten products show significant estimates and all point 
estimates are above 20 per cent. At the very high end, ‘static converters’ imported from related 
affiliates in low-tax countries are ‘overpriced’ by more than 80 per cent.  
Table 3: Related and unrelated average import prices across high- and low-tax partners 
  Average log (unit price) 
  High-tax partner (1) Low-tax partner (2) Difference: (1)-(2) 
Unrelated partner 5.95*** 5.26*** 0.69*** 
  (0.17) (0.33) (0.18) 
Related partner 5.99*** 5.83*** 0.16** 
  (0.09) (0.84) (0.08) 
Difference: related minus unrelated 0.04 0,57*** 0,53*** 
  (0.04) (0.13) (0.14) 
Note: The table explores the effect of the trading partner (import origin) country's corporate tax rate on the import 
price in related trades (between affiliates) relative to the effect on domestic and unaffiliated firms. The sample 
period is 2011 to 2015.  A unit of observation is a firm-relation-origin-product-time quintuble. The dependent 
variable is the Log (Unit Value). The product is defined by HS8 codes. ‘Low-tax partner’ is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the trading partner (import origin) country's corporate tax rate is below the South African 
corporate tax rate of 28 per cent. ‘Related partner’ is a dummy variable indicating an internal (controlled) trade 
between affiliates of the same MNE. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at the country–year 
level. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on KPMG (n.d.) and SARS (n.d.). 
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Figure 3: ‘Overpricing’ of related low-tax imports within 10 largest product groups 
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
Note: The figure explores the effect of the trading partner (import origin) country's corporate tax rate on the import 
price in related trades (between affiliates) relative to the effect on domestic and unaffiliated firms within the 10 
largest product groups. The pink dots reflect the coefficient value β1 obtained from estimating the regression:  
Log(Unit priceit )=β1 * Relatedit*Low taxit  + β2 Low taxit  +β3*Relatedit+ϵit.. The product category names are 
simplified descriptions of the longer detailed HS8 code descriptions. The corresponding HS8 codes are: ‘rubber 
assembly’ 40169390 , ‘Computer part’ 84818090, ‘Taps/cocks’  ‘Seal of rubber’ 40169310, ‘Small electric 
conductor’ 85444290, ‘Bolt/screw’ 73181590, ‘Steel article, other’ 73269090, ‘Static converter’ 85044000, ‘Book/ 
brochure’ 49019900, ‘Plastic article, other’  39269090. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on KPMG (n.d.) and SARS (n.d.). 
Whereas Figure 3 supports the notion of strategic transfer mispricing, several concerns still exist. 
First, country-specific quality of goods may confound the results. Second, different firms may 
demand different qualities and, even within firms, products may be imported at different levels of 
quality. To ensure that compositional effects are not driving the results, I move on to estimate an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the form:  
log(unit priceit)=β1⋅related import⋅I(τ-τit) + 
β2⋅I(τ-τit>0) +β3⋅related importit+Xit
' B+ϵit              (1) 
log(unit priceit)=β1⋅related import⋅(τ-τit) + 
β2⋅(τ-τit) +β3⋅related importit+Xit
' B+ϵit (2) 
The unit of observation is at the firm-product-relation-country-year level. Standard errors are 
clustered at the country–year level. Xit  is a vector of firm and country variables. relatedit is a dummy 
indicator taking the value one whenever the import partner is a related subsidiary and accounts for 
any level differences in the price level of related and unrelated imports. The tax differential between 
the South African tax rate τ (28 per cent throughout the sample period) and the partner tax rate τit 
approximates the incentive to shift profits. If firms shift profits through transfer mispricing the 
price wedge between related and unrelated imports will increase as the tax rate of the partner 
country decreases, implying that β
1
>0. In equation (1), I estimate β
1
 as a dummy coefficient, which 
can be interpreted as the average percentage deviation from the arm’s-length price when importing 
goods from affiliates in low-tax countries (where τ>τit). In equation (2), I estimate β1 as a semi-
elasticity, such that β
1
 is the average percentage change in the deviation from the arm’s-length 
All products
Plastic article, other
Book / brochure
Static converter
Steel article, other
Bolt / screw
Small electric conductor
Seal of rubber
Taps / cocks
Computer part
Rubber assembly
-.3 0 .3 .6 .9 1.2
DD coefficient 95% confidence band
13 
price when the tax differential increases by 1 percentage point. The rich detail of the data allows 
me to move further and include a series of fixed effects. In the highest dimensional model this 
includes product–firm, firm–year, product–year, country–product, and country–year fixed effects. 
In this case, country and firm variables are absorbed by the fixed effects and only the interaction 
terms remain. 
What is the appropriate dimension of fixed effects? While there is often an inclination to assume 
that more fixed effects is better, there is in fact a trade-off. On one hand we want to avoid omitted 
variable bias. In particular, it seems crucial to account for firm, product, year, and country specific 
effects, as different products come at different prices and product quality will differ dramatically 
across firms, years, and countries. On the other hand, we might have concerns about overfitting, 
attenuation bias, and suppressing valuable information. In particular, firms may be sufficiently 
perceptive to not openly provoke tax authorities and avoid pricing the same good differently in 
related and unrelated transactions. Instead, firms may focus their mispricing on goods that they 
only transact internally. This implies that including firm–product fixed effects might lead to a 
downward bias in the estimate of transfer mispricing. In practice, after controlling for firm fixed 
effects, I find a very stable estimate of transfer mispricing for a wide range of additional fixed 
effects. This implies that, after controlling for firm specificity, the exact level of fixed effects is 
unimportant for the quantitative findings. 
5.3 Basic results 
In Figure 1a and Table 4, Panel A, I report the estimated β
1
 coefficient from equation (1)—that 
is, the average percentage deviation from the arm’s-length price deviation when importing goods 
from affiliated firms in low-tax countries (where τ>τit). Throughout all specifications, the 
interaction term between the related import dummy and the low-tax dummy is positive and highly 
significant. This implies that transfer prices systematically deviate from the estimated arm’s-length 
price in accordance with the tax incentive to do so. In column 1 of Table 4, the most basic results 
are reported using just a set of control variables and yearly fixed effects. The estimated average 
excess price on related imports from low-tax countries is 31 per cent. This estimate remains fairly 
stable when including product fixed effects and product–year fixed effects but drops significantly 
to 10 per cent when firm fixed effects are included. This indeed indicates that firm compositional 
effects may drive up the estimated magnitude of transfer mispricing when failing to account for 
firm-specific characteristics. However, as seen in columns 4 to 12, after controlling for firm fixed 
effects the estimated transfer mispricing does not change drastically when more fixed effects are 
added to the model. In the most demanding model, which includes product–firm, firm–year, 
product–year, country–product, and country–year fixed effects, the estimated excess price on 
related imports from low-tax countries is 8.6 per cent.  
In Figure 4b and Table 4, Panel B, I report the β
1
 coefficients obtained from estimating equation 
(2)—that is, the estimated semi-elasticity of the arm’s-length price deviation with respect to the 
tax differential. Throughout all specifications, the interaction term between the related import 
dummy and the low-tax dummy is positive and highly significant. In column 1 of Table 4 the most 
basic results are reported using just a set of control variables and yearly fixed effects. The estimated 
semi-elasticity is 2.5—implying that a 1 percentage point increase in the tax differential increases 
the estimated deviation from the arm’s-length price by 2.5 per cent. Once again, this estimate drops 
significantly to around 0.5 when firm fixed effects are included. After controlling for firm fixed 
effects, the estimate does not change drastically when firm–product, country, and further fixed 
effects are included. In the most demanding model, which includes product–firm, firm–year, 
product–year, country–product, and country–year fixed effects, the estimated semi-elasticity is 
0.51. 
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I report the full regression results in Appendix Table A2a. I find, unsurprisingly, that country 
characteristics influence unit prices. For example, GDP per capita of the country of origin 
correlates positively with unit prices. This seems intuitive, as goods originating from high-income 
countries are plausibly of higher quality. Furthermore, the unit price is generally higher in high-tax 
countries. This suggests that, absent any partner relation, firms shift part of the tax burden of 
corporate taxation towards consumers. All these effects are, of course, absorbed when using 
country–year fixed effects. I do not find a robust relationship between firm characteristics and 
import unit prices and, again, whatever the relationship may be, this is absorbed by the firm–year 
fixed effects.  
I do a series of robustness checks of these results. First, using the re-weighting procedure by 
DiNardo et al. (1996) and Boserup et al. (2016), I match observations based on transaction size 
and then estimate the model on the matched sample. This does not change the results (see 
Appendix Table A2c). Finally, I confine the sample to MNE transactions only and control for 
whether a subsidiary is located in the country (following Cristea and Nguyen 2016). This does not 
change the results (see Appendix Table A2d).
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Table 4: Basic results  
Dependent variable: Log (Unit Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Panel A: Impact of transacting with related low-tax partner on deviation from arm's-length price 
Related partner  × low-tax partner 0.307*** 0.283*** 0.281*** 0.101*** 0.0905*** 0.0829*** 0.0785*** 0.0887*** 0.0877*** 0.0836*** 0.0859*** 0.0859*** 
  (0.0600) (0.0502) (0.0499) (0.0251) (0.0253) (0.0203) (0.0182) (0.0237) (0.0207) (0.0189) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
Related partner  -0.337 0.886 0.919 -0.473 -0.401 0.318 0.361 0.108 0.142 0.183 0.403 0.403 
  (1.111) (0.893) (0.895) (0.633) (0.621) (0.408) (0.403) (0.497) (0.441) (0.430) (0.308) (0.308) 
Observations 2,445,511 2,410,173 2,410,173 2,410,173 2,410,173 1,859,084 1,855,497 2,410,173 1,867,562 1,867,517 3,230,145 3,230,145 
R-squared 0.083 0.477 0.482 0.338 0.361 0.804 0.807 0.853 0.800 0.802 0.825 0.825 
Panel B: Impact of transacting with related low-tax partner on deviation from arm's-length price 
Related partner  × (τ-τit) 2.512*** 2.110*** 2.099*** 0.717*** 0.690*** 0.393*** 0.416** 0.546** 0.540** 0.441** 0.510*** 0.510*** 
  (0.491) (0.447) (0.442) (0.231) (0.225) (0.139) (0.208) (0.248) (0.218) (0.222) (0.178) (0.178) 
Related partner  -0.749 0.579 0.561 -0.802 -0.792 0.297 0.0135 0.0308 0.0563 -0.208 -0.0261 -0.0261 
  (1.372) (1.161) (1.153) (0.726) (0.662) (0.446) (0.497) (0.591) (0.523) (0.522) (0.399) (0.399) 
Observations 2,386,350 2,386,350 2,386,350 2,386,350 2,386,350 1,841,887 1,838,348 2,386,350 1,850,237 1,850,214 3,184,633 3,184,633 
R-squared 0.082 0.475 0.48 0.338 0.361 0.803 0.807 0.853 0.8 0.802 0.825 0.825 
Pricing to market controls 
Macro controls in partner country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes (absorbed) (absorbed) (absorbed) 
Related partner x market conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm controls (Sales, wage bill) Yes Yes Yes Yes (absorbed) (absorbed) (absorbed) Yes Yes Yes (absorbed) (absorbed) 
Fixed effects 
Year Yes 
  
Yes 
   
Yes 
    
Product 
 
Yes 
          
Product#Year 
  
Yes 
   
Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm 
   
Yes 
        
Firm#Year         Yes Yes Yes 
   
Yes Yes 
Product#Country         
 
Yes Yes 
    
Yes 
Country#Year         
  
Yes 
  
Yes Yes Yes 
Firm#Product         
   
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The table explores the effect of the trading partner (import origin) country's corporate tax rate on the import price in related trades (between affiliates) relative to the effect on domestic and unaffiliated firms. The sample 
period is 2011 to 2015. A unit of observation is a firm-relation-origin-product-time quintuble. The dependent variable is the Log(Unit Value). The product is defined by HS8 codes. ‘low-tax partner’ is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the trading partner (import origin) country's corporate tax rate is below the South African corporate tax rate of 28 per cent. The tax differential (τ-τit) is the difference between the South African corporate 
tax rate and the partner country tax rate. ‘Related partner’ is a dummy variable indicating an internal (controlled) trade between affiliates of the same MNE. ‘Macro controls in partner country’/‘Market conditions’ include GDP 
per capita, population, exchange rate and distance to partner. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at the country–year level. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on KPMG (n.d.), SARS (n.d.), and World Bank (n.d.). 
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Figure 4: The impact of tax incentives on deviations from arm’s-length pricing 
  Figure 4a: % difference to arm’s-length price when importing from a low-tax partner 
 
  Figure 4b: Impact of tax differential to partner on % difference to arm’s-length price 
 
Note: The figure explores the effect of the trading partner (import origin) country's corporate tax rate on the import 
price in related trades (between affiliates) relative to the effect on unaffiliated transactions. Figure 4a plots the β1 
coefficient estimate from equation (1) reported as ‘low-tax partner x related’ in Table 4 Panel A. Figure 4b plots 
the β1 coefficient estimate from equation (2) reported as ‘Tax differential x related’ in Table 4 Panel B. The 
horizontal axis indicates the fixed-effect dimensions of the estimated model. All regressions control for firm and 
country characteristics. See Appendix Table A2a/b for full regression results. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on KPMG (n.d.), SARS (n.d.), and World Bank (n.d.). 
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Drivers of transfer mispricing responses 
In Table 5, I investigate whether specific subsamples of South African subsidiaries are more 
responsive to tax incentives. In column 1, the baseline specification using the full sample is 
reported, in which the estimated semi-elasticity with respect to the partner tax rate was -0.51. In 
column 2, the sample is restricted to firms with sales above the South African median—this does 
not impact the semi-elasticity estimates. Column 3 shows that profitable subsidiaries respond more 
to tax incentives, which is intuitive, as they have profits to shift. Differentiated goods may be easier 
to manipulate transfer price as there are less clear comparable prices. In column 4, I restrict the 
sample to differentiated goods using the ‘naïve’ classification from Bernard et al. (2006). Consistent 
with theory, I observe an increase in the estimated tax response. Finally, high leverage may be an 
indication of subsidiaries engaging in debt shifting, which could impact their transfer mispricing. 
The results reported in column 5, where the sample is restricted to firms with leverage in the top 
median, do not seem to support this.  
Table 5: Drivers of transfer price manipulation 
Dependent variable: ln (unit price) 
  (1) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Full sample Big firms Profitable Differentiated High leverage 
Related partner  × (τ-τit) 0.510*** 0.526*** 0.654*** 0.751*** 0.518** 
  (0.178) (0.181) (0.215) (0.217) (0.204) 
Observations 3,184,633 2,616,580 2,463,077 1,675,410 1,868,665 
R-squared 0.825 0.815 0.823 0.797 0.798 
Note: This table replicates the prefered estimate in Table 4, Panel B, column 12 across different samples to 
identify the drivers of profit shifting. Column 1 uses the full sample. Column 2 restricts the sample to imports 
originating from countries with a corporate tax rate below 28 per cent. Column 3 restricts the sample to firms with 
above median sales. Column 4 restricts the sample to profitable firms. Column 5 restricts the sample to 
differentiated imports defined using the Bernard et al. (2006) naïve classification. Column 6 restricts the sample 
to firms with above median sales.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at the country–year 
level. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on KPMG (n.d.), SARS (n.d.), and World Bank (n.d.). 
Other tax incentives for transfer mispricing 
There might be tax benefits other than a low statutory tax rate in tax havens. Davies et al. (2018) 
find that the bulk of transfer mispricing occurs through tax havens. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 
6 the related dummy is interacted with a dummy variable taking the value one whenever the 
country of origin is a tax haven. I use the tax haven definition from Hines (2010). Contrary to 
Davies et al. (2018), the results do not seem to support the view that tax havens are driving the 
semi-elasticity from previous specifications. To some extent, this is not surprising, as only 4 per 
cent of related imports to South Africa originate from tax havens. Hopland et al. (2018) 
hypothesize that loss-making subsidiaries may receive profits from foreign affiliates, the reasoning 
being that the loss-making subsidiaries are effectively paying zero per cent tax on additional 
earnings. Loss-carry-forward rules complicate this reasoning as present losses can be converted 
into future tax savings (Dharmapala and Riedel 2013). I test the hypothesis of Hopland et al. (2018) 
by interacting a loss dummy with the related dummy. If foreign affiliates are shifting profits to 
South African subsidiaries, we would expect this interaction to be negative, as related imports to 
loss-making subsidiaries would be under-priced. The results are reported in column 3 of Table 6. 
There seems to be little support for the view that South African loss-making subsidiaries are 
receiving foreign profits, as the interaction term is insignificant. 
  
18 
Table 6: Other tax incentives for transfer price manipulation 
Dependent variable: ln (unit price) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
   
Related partner × haven partner 0.00765 0.0249 
 
  (0.0504) (0.0517) 
 
Related partner  × (τ-τit)  0.546*** 
 
  
 
(0.183) 
 
Related partner × loss-making  
 
0.0296 
  
  
(0.0220) 
Observations 3,242,222 3,195,595 2,960,756 
R-squared 0.825 0.825 0.820 
Note: This table explores whether tax incentives other than the tax differential to the partner country may drive 
arm's-length deviations. This is done by re-estimating Table 4, Panel A, column 12 but replacing the tax incentive 
by 1) ‘haven partner’; a dummy variable taking the value 1 whenever the partner country is listed as a tax haven 
in Hines (2010). 2) ‘Loss-making’; a dummy variable taking the value one whenever the import firm is loss-
making.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at the country–year level. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on KPMG (n.d.), SARS (n.d.), and World Bank (n.d.). 
5.4 Quantifying the tax loss 
In this section, I estimate the tax loss of tax-motivated transfer mispricing using the empirical 
results in Section 5.3. I simply estimate the total tax loss by applying the estimated arm’s-length 
price deviation from equation 1 to all transactions with countries that have a tax rate lower than 
that of South Africa (i.e. lower than 28 per cent). Following previous literature, this estimate 
assumes that transactions would still occur in the situation where no tax incentives were present, 
but that systematic tax-motivated transfer mispricing would cease to exist. I use my preferred 
estimate in column 12 in Table 4, Panel A, which is an average tax-motivated arm’s-length price 
deviation of 8.59 per cent. In Table 7, columns 2–4, I compute the resulting tax loss: using my 
preferred estimate in row 1, the tax loss is less than 2 per cent of foreign-owned firms’ tax 
payments, 0.5 per cent of corporate tax receipts, and 0.1 per cent of total tax receipts. This tax loss 
is, by my account, negligible. I do a sensitivity analysis of this estimate by increasing the arm’s-
length deviation and find that even using the largest estimated arm’s-length deviation of 30 per 
cent (column1, Table 4, Panel A), the tax loss is still negligible. 
Table 7: Tax loss of transfer mispricing 
Transfer mispricing estimate Share of tax base: 
 
Foreign- owned firms All corporations Total tax revenue 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
8.6% 1.7% 0.5% 0.10% 
10.0% 2.0% 0.6% 0.1% 
20.0% 4.0% 1.2% 0.2% 
30.0% 6.0% 1.8% 0.3% 
40.0% 8.0% 2.4% 0.5% 
50.0% 10.0% 3.0% 0.6% 
60.0% 12.0% 3.6% 0.7% 
70.0% 14.0% 4.2% 0.8% 
Note: The transfer mispricing estimate is the average tax induced difference to the arm’s-length price. This 
estimate is multiplied by the customs value of related goods imports from low-tax countries to compute the tax 
loss. The first row uses the preferred estimate from column 11 in Table 4. The subsequent rows show the 
robustness of the results. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on KPMG (n.d.), SARS (n.d.), and National Treasury (2018). 
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6 Consequences of an OECD-recommended reform 
On 1 April 2012, South Africa revised their transfer pricing legislation to follow the standards of 
the OECD and WTO. The practical consequences of this revision were uncertain at first 
(International Tax Review 2012). The formal change in the legislation related largely to a change 
of wording of a single paragraph:  
• Prior to 1 April 2012:16 ‘the Commissioner may… adjust the consideration in respect of the 
transaction to reflect the arm’s length price for the goods or services’;  
• After 1 April 2012:17 ‘the taxable income or tax payable by any person … must be calculated as if 
that transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding had been entered into on 
the terms and conditions that would have existed had those persons been independent 
persons dealing at arm’s length’.  
Firstly, as marked in italic letters, the previous legislation only gave the tax authority the right to 
intervene whenever they found that the arm’s-length principle had been overstepped. However, 
under the new legislation the firm was now obligated to prove that internal relations were 
organized according to the arm’s-length principle. This shifted the onus of proof from the tax 
authority to the tax payer. In practice, the meaning of this distinction was less clear, as the previous 
legislation had also required firms to present transfer pricing documentation in support of transfer 
pricing decisions. In the end, a practical consequence of this distinction was that the tax authority 
would now require the same documentation with shorter notice (PWC 2013).  
Secondly, as underlined in the above paragraphs, previous legislation focused on specific 
transactions whereas the new legislation followed the OECD tax model by applying a more holistic 
view. This implied taking factors such as overall profitability into account when determining 
whether chosen transfer prices were acceptable. The actual consequences of this broader definition 
of audit strategy was at first unclear to firms but was widely regarded as an increase in audit risk.18  
To test the impact of the legislation, I estimate the baseline specification on a year-by-year basis. 
The results are striking. Table 8 shows that the tax-motivated arm’s-length price deviation fell 
dramatically from above 0.7 in 2011 to below 0.5 in 2012 and fell further to below 0.4 in 2013 and 
2014. Furthermore, the tax-motivated deviation from the arm’s-length price was not significant 
from 2012 to 2014.  
To be clear, none of these differences are statistically significant, but they suggest that firms 
responded to the reform by closing the gap to estimated arm’s-length pricing in the immediate 
aftermath of the reform. Interestingly, however, in 2015 the estimated semi-elasticity not only 
reached the 2011 level but it was actually slightly above the initial level with a semi-elasticity of 
0.85. This suggests that the immediate response to the transfer price legislation reform was based 
on an unfounded expectation of increased audit capacities and that firms returned to their original 
transfer price manipulation practice after they obtained certainty about the implication of the new 
policy. This conclusion is not surprising: granting more information and discretion to the tax 
authority will not result in higher tax compliance if there is no increase in tax enforcement 
                                                 
16 SAICA (2010). 
17 OECD (2013).  
18 PWC (2013), for example, informs tax payers that they have ‘seen increased audit activity by the specialist Transfer 
Pricing unit within SARS across all industries’.  
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resources and capabilities (see e.g. Pomeranz 2015). As I will discuss in Section 8, data analytics 
may solve the problem of how to process the abundance of information available to the tax 
authority and hence credibly increase the audit risk of firms that engage in transfer mispricing. 
Table 8: Evaluation of a transfer pricing reform in April 2012 
Dependent variable: ln (unit price) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
      
Related partner  × (τ-τit) 0.721*** 0.452 0.28 0.343 0.847*** 
 
(0.217) (0.369) (0.444) (0.391) (0.262) 
Observations 475,611 520,669 177,803 545,567 295,619 
R-squared 0.810 0.805 0.812 0.799 0.811 
Note: The table explores the effect of a transfer pricing reform occuring in April 2012. This is done by re-
estimating column 12 in Table 4, Panel B on a year-to-year basis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors 
clustered at the country-year level. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on KPMG (n.d.), SARS (n.d.), and World Bank (n.d.). 
7 Transfer mispricing in South Africa vs. developed countries 
To understand how transfer mispricing in South Africa compares to that of other countries, I 
collected all the semi-elasticities reported in prior studies. I normalize the coefficients such that 
the coefficient is positive when it confirms profit-shifting behaviour. Clausing (2003) and Davies 
et al. (2018) report elasticities (not semi-elasticities); their estimates are transformed to semi-
elasticities using the average tax differential of the papers.19 In Figure 5a, I report the basic results; 
the full review is available in the online appendix. What is most striking is the enormous variation 
in point estimates across studies from 8.0 in Clausing (2003) to -1.1 in Liu et al. (2017). The overall 
average estimate (weighted by study) is 1.3, which is twice as large as the preferred estimate in this 
paper of 0.51. In Figure 5b, I limit the sample of estimates to studies using firm and product fixed 
effects. Clausing (2003) does not use firm fixed effects and is therefore not included in this graph. 
Limiting the sample to estimates using firm and product fixed effects lowers the average (study 
weighted) estimated semi-elasticity to 0.37, which is slightly lower than my preferred estimate. 
Without exception, the estimated semi-elasticity falls within studies when moving from no fixed 
effects to firm and product fixed effects. This suggests that failing to account for firm and product 
fixed effects will upwardly bias the results.  
The conclusion from Figures 5a and 5b is primarily that the accuracy of point estimates is not 
overwhelming. However, in bundling all estimates, I disregard that some estimates are regarded as 
less valid by the authors themselves. In Table 9, I report the preferred estimate of each paper and 
the resulting estimated tax loss. Strikingly, five out of six papers find that the preferred estimate of 
the semi-elasticity is between 0.2 and 0.7—the exception being Liu et al. (2017) with a preferred 
estimate of 2.7. Despite the large semi-elasticity, Liu et al. (2018) still find that tax losses are small. 
In fact, all papers but Vicard (2015) find that transfer mispricing of goods results in a tax loss of 
less than 1 per cent of corporate tax receipts. This supports the argument in Tørsløv et al. (2018) 
that the main vehicle of profit shifting is service transactions.   
                                                 
19 I do this using the identity that the elasticity with respect to the tax differential 
Δp
𝑝
⋅
𝜏
Δ𝜏
 can be rewritten as ϵ⋅
1
τ
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It follows from Figure 5 and Table 9 that the estimated transfer mispricing in South Africa is 
neither systematically higher nor lower than what is observed in previous studies from Denmark, 
the UK, France, and the US. 
Figure 5: Reported semi-elasticities in prior research 
  Figure 5a: All semi-elasticities  
 
  Figure 5b: Semi-elasticities in studies with firm and product fixed effects 
 
Note: This figure shows the reported semi-elasticities of prior studies on transfer mispricing of goods. The semi-
elasticity is defined as the percentage change in the distance to the arm’s-length price in response to a 
percentage point change in the tax differential between related transacting parties. 
Source: Author’s own literature review (see online appendix). 
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Table 9: Micro studies of transfer mispricing of goods 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  
Bernard et al. 
(2006) 
Cristea & 
Nguyen (2016) 
Davies et 
al. (2018) 
Flaaen 
(2017) 
Liu et al. 
(2017) 
Vicard 
(2015) 
Vicard 
(2015) 
All prior 
papers 
This 
paper 
Scope of study  
Year of estimate 2004 2006 1999 2000 2010 2008 2008 1999–2008 2014 
Country 
US DK FR US UK FR FR High 
income 
SA 
Direction Exports Exports Exports Imports Exports Exports Imports Exp & Imp Imports 
Estimated semi-elasticity  
Authors' prefered semi-elasticity 0.65*** 0.57** 0.26** 0.60*** 2.7** 0.22** 0.240** 0.84 0.510** 
  (0.05) (0.272) (0.13) (0.226) (1.1) (0.08) (0.12) 
 
(0.27) 
Overall mean point estimate 1.10 0.61 0.18 0.60 1.18 0.15 0.21 0.64 0.96 
Mean point estimate with firm and product FE N/A 0.62 0.21 0.60 0.49 0.15 0.21 0.42 0.48 
Maximum point estimate 4.18 1.67 0.31 0.60 4.1 0.3 0.39 4.18 2.51 
Minimum point estimate 0.39 0.01 0.06 0.60 -1.1 -0.13 0.05 -1.1 0.39 
Estimated tax loss (according to study)  
Tax loss in million Euro 666 32 340 N/A 196 1,546 1,250 
 
78 
Corporate income tax revenue in million Euro 218,487 8,344 36,872 N/A 50,984 56,670 56,670 
 
15,696 
Tax loss in percentage of CIT 0.3% 0.4% 0.9% N/A 0.4% 2.7% 2.2% 0.9% 0.5% 
Note: This figure shows the reported semi-elasticities and estimated tax loss of prior studies on transfer mispricing of goods. The semi-elasticity is defined as the percentage 
change in the distance to the arm’s-length price in response to a percentage point change in the tax differential between related transacting parties. 
Source: Author’s own literature review (see online appendix).
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8 Conclusion and implications for digital tax enforcement 
This paper provides the first direct evidence of transfer mispricing in a developing country. Using 
highly detailed firm-level customs data, I found that deviations from estimated arm’s-length prices 
correlate with the tax incentive to shift profits, which is interpreted as strong evidence of tax-
motivated transfer mispricing of goods.  
I evaluated a recent OECD-recommended reform that increased the documentational 
requirements and audit discretion of the tax authority. I found that transfer mispricing fell in the 
immediate aftermath of the reform but later returned to its initial level. I argued that an unjustified 
fear of higher audit risk led to the initial response of firms. As soon as it became clear that the tax 
authority did not increase its enforcement efforts, the effect of the reform disappeared.  
I carried out a systematic review of previous literature on transfer mispricing in advanced 
economies. Contrary to the common perception, I found that transfer mispricing of goods in 
South Africa is on par with transfer mispricing of goods in developed countries. Furthermore, 
across these countries and South Africa, the tax losses were negligible as a share of total corporate 
taxes paid. This suggests (perhaps unsurprisingly) that transfer mispricing of goods is not the most 
important channel of profit shifting. Indeed, the OECD (2014, 2015a) and Tørsløv et al. (2018) 
argue that service transactions and shifting of intellectual property rights are the main drivers of 
profit shifting.  
There might be a very cost-effective way to curb transfer mispricing of goods. Tax authorities 
around the world find themselves in a situation where information is in abundance but not 
efficiently exploited. When a firm prices a product differently in related and unrelated transactions 
should this not lead to an automatic audit? Or, as a minimum, should a flag not be raised and an 
email sent to the firm cautioning them to stop this behaviour? Academics and senior officials have 
asked me these questions on numerous occasions. The short answer is no. To my knowledge, no 
tax authority has set up an automated flagging system that tests for deviations in the pricing of 
related and unrelated transactions. This seems to be a very low-hanging fruit for tax authorities 
globally to pursue. In many cases, the data is already there, stored in a raw format on a server and 
used in the calculation of import statistics. Tax authorities in some countries will exploit this data 
source after they have decided to audit a firm—after being the key word here. It took me two weeks 
to set up the data in South Africa such that it could automatically flag companies with systematic 
deviations from estimated arm’s-length pricing.20 The costs of doing this is in the thousands of 
dollars while the potential tax gain is in the tens of millions of dollars; that is, despite the tax loss 
being negligible compared to total tax revenue, the tax loss is enormous compared to the cost of 
this digital intervention. Such an intervention is an example of the potential for digital tax 
enforcement, which the OECD (2016) and the IMF (2017) is promoting. The fact that I (and 
others) find systematic mispricing using this methodology implies that there should be some scope 
to pursue this further.  
  
                                                 
20 Friedrich Kreuser also deserves credit for the entire process of obtaining the data from SARS. 
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Appendix tables 
Country Corp. tax rate Freq. Country Corp. tax rate Freq.
Germany 0.30 16795 China 0.25 1054653
China 0.25 11274 United States 0.40 551591
United States 0.40 9138 Germany 0.30 487778
France 0.33 6457 United Kingdom 0.23 308830
United Kingdom 0.23 5942 Italy 0.31 248051
Japan 0.36 5725 India 0.33 169529
Italy 0.31 5275 Taiwan 0.17 161703
India 0.34 4903 France 0.33 145291
Korea Rep. 0.24 3749 Japan 0.37 142708
Spain 0.29 3454 Netherlands 0.25 97658
Thailand 0.21 3013 Thailand 0.23 77554
Sweden 0.24 2701 Spain 0.30 73837
Czech Republic 0.19 2698 Hong Kong 0.17 72342
Poland 0.19 2347 Korea Rep. 0.24 72071
Austria 0.25 2313 Switzerland 0.18 66111
Brazil 0.34 2167 Turkey 0.20 62949
Turkey 0.20 2117 Belgium 0.34 62172
Taiwan 0.17 2017 Australia 0.30 53087
Switzerland 0.18 1768 Sweden 0.24 50868
Mexico 0.30 1718 Canada 0.27 48484
Netherlands 0.25 1713 Austria 0.25 47200
Hungary 0.19 1687 Namibia 0.33 47138
Belgium 0.34 1594 Botswana 0.22 43945
Australia 0.30 1529 Czech Republic 0.19 41414
Finland 0.21 1235 Mexico 0.30 41313
Romania 0.16 1235 Brazil 0.34 40388
Canada 0.27 1206 Malaysia 0.25 39115
Indonesia 0.25 1129 Denmark 0.25 36996
Portugal 0.23 1085 Poland 0.19 36934
Denmark 0.24 1048 Singapore 0.17 29200
Slovakia 0.21 1036 UAE 0.55 28870
Malaysia 0.25 1035 Indonesia 0.25 27217
Vietnam 0.23 685 Hungary 0.19 24405
Singapore 0.17 619 Israel 0.25 22478
Ireland 0.13 518 Pakistan 0.34 21834
United Arab Emirates 0.55 401 Portugal 0.24 21390
Israel 0.26 393 Vietnam 0.23 20983
Philippines 0.30 385 Finland 0.23 20786
Hong Kong SAR China 0.17 339 Ireland 0.13 18943
Slovenia 0.17 335 Romania 0.16 15854
Source: Author's calculations using SARS (n.d), KPMG (n.d.) and World Bank (n.d.)
Note: The table shows the distribution of South African imports of goods by origin countries for the years 
2011-2015. Related denotes a transaction that is intra-firm (controlled), i.e. trade between affiliates of the 
same MNE. Corp. tax rate denotes the average statutory corporate tax rate.
Related imports Unrelated imports
Appendix Table A1: Imports by country
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Table A2a: Basic results (full regression results) 
Dependent variable: Log (Unit Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Tax incentives in related transactions 
Related partner  × low tax partner 0.307*** 0.283*** 0.281*** 0.101*** 0.0905*** 0.0829*** 0.0785*** 0.0887*** 0.0877*** 0.0836*** 0.0859*** 0.0859*** 
  (0.0600) (0.0502) (0.0499) (0.0251) (0.0253) (0.0203) (0.0182) (0.0237) (0.0207) (0.0189) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
Related partner  -0.337 0.886 0.919 -0.473 -0.401 0.318 0.361 0.108 0.142 0.183 0.403 0.403 
  (1.111) (0.893) (0.895) (0.633) (0.621) (0.408) (0.403) (0.497) (0.441) (0.430) (0.308) (0.308) 
Pricing to market controls 
Related partner  × ln (Population) 0.240*** 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.0599** 0.0644** 0.0239 0.0567*** 0.0146 0.0156 0.0481*** 0.0538*** 0.0538*** 
  (0.0569) (0.0441) (0.0441) (0.0273) (0.0260) (0.0183) (0.0169) (0.0218) (0.0193) (0.0178) (0.0136) (0.0136) 
Related partner  × ln (Ex. Rate) 0.0201 0.00790 0.00816 0.0135 0.0110 0.00215 -0.00812* 0.00525 0.00522 -0.00545 -0.00886** -0.00886** 
  (0.0201) (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.00875) (0.00826) (0.00542) (0.00452) (0.00663) (0.00586) (0.00482) (0.00365) (0.00365) 
Related partner  × ln (GDP per capita) -0.176*** -0.0931* -0.0921* -0.0569* -0.0627** -0.0163 -0.0430** -0.00519 -0.00727 -0.0333 -0.0400** -0.0400** 
  (0.0658) (0.0493) (0.0491) (0.0328) (0.0309) (0.0205) (0.0194) (0.0247) (0.0218) (0.0205) (0.0160) (0.0160) 
Related partner  × ln (Distance) 0.178 -0.0399 -0.0441 0.0954 0.0925 -0.0297 -0.00601 -0.0187 -0.0195 0.00365 -0.0137 -0.0137 
  (0.135) (0.105) (0.106) (0.0869) (0.0845) (0.0510) (0.0514) (0.0628) (0.0556) (0.0547) (0.0411) (0.0411) 
Macro economic controls 
Low tax partner (τ-τit>0) -0.431*** -0.402*** -0.403*** -0.162*** -0.160*** -0.135*** 41.01 -0.136*** -0.136*** 
   
  (0.0636) (0.0549) (0.0548) (0.0290) (0.0293) (0.0217) (530,812) (0.0246) (0.0217) 
   
Log (GDP per capita) 0.415*** 0.271*** 0.271*** 0.200*** 0.201*** 0.112*** 23.13 0.111*** 0.112*** 
   
  (0.0554) (0.0386) (0.0387) (0.0249) (0.0242) (0.0154) (191,559) (0.0180) (0.0159) 
   
Log (Population) -0.519*** -0.377*** -0.377*** -0.234*** -0.234*** -0.158*** -2.929 -0.157*** -0.158*** 
   
  (0.0486) (0.0391) (0.0390) (0.0221) (0.0214) (0.0153) (143,162) (0.0179) (0.0158) 
   
Log (Exchange rate) -0.0466*** -0.0576*** -0.0574*** -0.0293*** -0.0278*** -0.0211*** -7.617 -0.0216*** -0.0216*** 
   
  (0.0169) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.00827) (0.00816) (0.00559) (79,868) (0.00639) (0.00566) 
   
Log (Distance) 0.245*** 0.285*** 0.283*** 0.158*** 0.146*** 0.165*** -163.0 0.166*** 0.165*** 
   
  (0.0648) (0.0451) (0.0449) (0.0362) (0.0361) (0.0250) (607,844) (0.0289) (0.0253) 
   
Firm controls 
Log (Sales) -0.140*** -0.0680*** -0.0682*** 0.0195* 
   
0.0170* 0.0177** 0.0159** 
  
  (0.00780) (0.00582) (0.00584) (0.0112) 
   
(0.00941) (0.00809) (0.00765) 
  
Log (Wage bill) 0.207*** 0.121*** 0.121*** -0.000382 
   
-0.00297 -0.00210 -0.00206 
  
  (0.0109) (0.00912) (0.00918) (0.00668) 
   
(0.00636) (0.00565) (0.00559) 
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Fixed effects 
Product 
 
Yes 
          
Product#Year 
  
Yes 
   
Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm 
   
Yes 
        
Firm#Year 
    
Yes Yes Yes 
   
Yes Yes 
Product#Country 
     
Yes Yes 
    
Yes 
Country#Year 
      
Yes 
  
Yes Yes Yes 
Firm#Product 
       
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,445,511 2,410,173 2,410,173 2,410,173 2,410,173 1,859,084 1,855,497 2,410,173 1,867,562 1,867,517 3,230,145 3,230,145 
R-squared 0.083 0.477 0.482 0.338 0.361 0.804 0.807 0.853 0.800 0.802 0.825 0.825 
Note: The table explores the effect of the trading partner (import origin) country's corporate tax rate on the import price in related trades (between affiliates) relative to the effect on domestic 
and unaffiliated firms. The sample period is 2011 to 2015. A unit of observation is a firm-relation-origin-product-time quintuble. The dependent variable is the Log (Unit Value). The product is 
defined by HS8 codes. ’Low tax partner is a dummy variable indicating whether the trading partner (import origin) country's corporate tax rate is below the South African corporate tax rate of 
28 per cent. ’Related partner’ is a dummy variable indicating an internal (controlled) trade between affiliates of the same MNE. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at 
the country–year level. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on KPMG (n.d.), SARS (n.d.), and World Bank (n.d.).  
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Table A2b: Basic results (full regression results) 
Dependent variable: Log(Unit Price) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Tax incentives in related transactions 
Related partner  × (τ-τit) 2.512*** 2.110*** 2.099*** 0.717*** 0.690*** 0.393*** 0.416** 0.546** 0.540** 0.441** 0.510*** 0.510*** 
  (0.491) (0.447) (0.442) (0.231) (0.225) (0.139) (0.208) (0.248) (0.218) (0.222) (0.178) (0.178) 
Related partner  -0.749 0.579 0.561 -0.802 -0.792 0.297 0.0135 0.0308 0.0563 -0.208 -0.0261 -0.0261 
  (1.372) (1.161) (1.153) (0.726) (0.662) (0.446) (0.497) (0.591) (0.523) (0.522) (0.399) (0.399) 
Pricing to market controls 
Related partner  × ln (Population) 0.255*** 0.167*** 0.165*** 0.0666** 0.0705*** 0.0511** 0.0593*** 0.0198 0.0206 0.0514** 0.0572*** 0.0572*** 
  (0.056) (0.0476) (0.0476) (0.0286) (0.0268) (0.0245) (0.0193) (0.0231) (0.0203) (0.02) (0.016) (0.016) 
Related partner  × ln (Ex. Rate) 0.0156 0.00805 0.0082 0.0115 0.00867 -0.0002 -0.0078 0.00517 0.00507 -0.00509 -0.00959** -0.00959** 
  (-0.0187) (-0.0152) (-0.0153) (-0.00877) (-0.00825) (-0.00664) (-0.00478) (-0.00648) (-0.00573) (-0.00506) (-0.00409) (-0.00409) 
Related partner  × ln (GDP per capita) -0.165** -0.0818 -0.0806 -0.0553 -0.0599* -0.0647*** -0.0478** -0.0049 -0.0068 -0.0391* -0.0444** -0.0444** 
  (0.0674) (0.0562) (0.0562) (0.0353) (0.0328) (0.025) (0.0227) (0.027) (0.0239) (0.0237) (0.0194) (0.0194) 
Related partner  × ln (Distance) 0.296* 0.0488 0.0494 0.153 0.154* 0.0289 0.055 0.00823 0.00794 0.0718 0.0587 0.0587 
  (0.158) (0.132) (0.131) (0.0936) (0.0846) (0.0573) (0.0644) (0.073) (0.0647) (0.0673) (0.0547) (0.0547) 
Macro economic controls 
Tax differential (τ -τit) -3.103*** -2.847*** -2.852*** -1.098*** -1.076***  
 
-1.047*** -1.049***  
  
  (0.579) (0.505) (0.505) (0.274) (0.275) 
  
(0.224) (0.198) 
   
Log (GDP per capita) 0.404*** 0.260*** 0.260*** 0.204*** 0.206*** 0.156*** 14 0.100*** 0.100*** 
   
  (0.0609) (0.0497) (0.0497) (0.0289) (0.0281) (0.0226) (72236) (0.0215) (0.019) 
   
Log (Population) -0.533*** -0.395*** -0.395*** -0.246*** -0.246*** -0.184*** -4.914 -0.159*** -0.159*** 
   
  (0.0509) (0.0462) (0.0461) (0.0242) (0.0236) (0.0238) (71291) (0.0196) (0.0173) 
   
Log (Exchange rate) -0.0467*** -0.0639*** -0.0638*** -0.0299*** -0.0283*** -0.0211*** -4.628 -0.0235*** -0.0235*** 
   
  (0.0146) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0078) (0.00771) (0.00676) (62606) (0.00585) (0.00518) 
   
Log (Distance) 0.191*** 0.257*** 0.255*** 0.132*** 0.119*** 0.122*** -190.7 0.168*** 0.167*** 
   
  (0.065) (0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0349) (0.0343) (0.027) (283208) (0.0307) (0.0269) 
   
Firm controls 
Log (Sales) -0.134*** -0.0676*** -0.0678*** 0.0189*    0.0164* 0.0175** 0.0160**   
  (-0.00749) (-0.00567) (-0.00569) (-0.0113)    (-0.0095) (-0.00814) (-0.00768)   
Log (Wage bill) 0.197*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 4.3E-05    -0.0018 -0.00086 -0.00119   
 (-0.0112) (-0.00928) (-0.00933) (-0.00681)   (-0.00652) (-0.0058) (-0.00562)    
Fixed effects 
Product  Yes           
Product#Year   Yes    Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm    Yes         
Firm#Year     Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes 
Product#Country      Yes Yes     Yes 
Country#Year       Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
32 
Firm#Product        Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,445,511 2,410,173 2,410,173 2,410,173 2,410,173 1,859,084 1,855,497 2,410,173 1,867,562 1,867,517 3,230,145 3,230,145 
R-squared 0.083 0.477 0.482 0.338 0.361 0.804 0.807 0.853 0.800 0.802 0.825 0.825 
Note: The table explores the effect of the trading partner (import origin) country's corporate tax rate on the import price in related trades (between affiliates) relative to the effect 
on domestic and unaffiliated firms. The sample period is 2011 to 2015. A unit of observation is a firm-relation-origin-product-time quintuble. The dependent variable is the Log 
(Unit Value). The product is defined by HS8 codes. ’Low tax partner’ is a dummy variable indicating whether the trading partner (import origin) country's corporate tax rate is 
below the South African corporate tax rate of 28 per cent. ’Related partner’ is a dummy variable indicating an internal (controlled) trade between affiliates of the same MNE. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at the country–year level. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on KPMG (n.d.), SARS (n.d.), and World Bank (n.d.). 
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Table A2c: Basic results with matching using the customs value  
Dependent variable: Log (Unit Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Tax incentives in related transactions 
Related partner × low tax partner 0.259*** 0.247*** 0.241*** 0.108*** 0.0987 0.0753*** 0.0746*** 0.0785** 0.0794*** 0.0787*** 0.0764*** 0.0764*** 
  0.0775 0.0616 0.0589 0.032 0 0.0261 0.0239 0.032 0.0271 0.0252 0.0222 0.0222 
Related partner  -0.39 0.863 0.896 0.316 0.343 0.658 0.804 0.575 0.554 0.723 0.661 0.661 
  1.346 1.092 1.057 0.647 0 0.547 0.536 0.686 0.583 0.579 0.461 0.461 
Pricing to market controls 
Related partner × ln (Population) 0.229*** 0.171*** 0.172*** 0.0856*** 0.0886 0.0421* 0.0794*** 0.0378 0.0377 0.0744*** 0.0742*** 0.0742*** 
  0.0625 0.0473 0.0465 0.0319 0 0.0238 0.0216 0.029 0.0245 0.0226 0.0189 0.0189 
Related partner × ln (Ex. Rate) 0.00762 -0.0002 0.00048 0.0107 0.00976 0.00234 -0.0054 0.00304 0.0036 -0.00424 -0.00597 -0.00597 
  
0.0193 0.015 0.0147 0.0094 0 0.00618 0.00516 0.00763 0.0066 0.00553 0.0047 0.0047 
Related partner × ln (GDP per capita) -0.190*** -0.141*** -0.140*** -0.0732* -0.0764 -0.0284 -0.0571** -0.0245 -0.0243 -0.0519** -0.0544** -0.0544** 
  0.0735 0.0541 0.0524 0.0374 0 0.0253 0.0234 0.0303 0.0258 0.024 0.0214 0.0214 
Related partner × ln (Distance) 0.22 0.0346 0.0283 0.0235 0.0226 -0.056 -0.0424 -0.0497 -0.0479 -0.0383 -0.0289 -0.0289 
  
0.158 0.126 0.122 0.0818 0 0.0621 0.0614 0.076 0.0652 0.0649 0.0552 0.0552 
Macro economic controls 
Low tax partner -0.353*** -0.331*** -0.330*** -0.162*** -0.16 -0.124*** -4.764 -0.124*** -0.124*** 
  
  
  0.06 0.0512 0.051 0.0314 0 0.0226 88386 0.0251 0.0223 
  
  
Log (GDP pr. cap.) 0.345*** 0.242*** 0.241*** 0.205*** 0.203 0.111*** -19.87 0.112*** 0.112*** 
  
  
  0.0559 0.0406 0.0403 0.0298 0 0.0189 47059 0.0218 0.0192 
  
  
Log (Population) -0.431*** -0.328*** -0.327*** -0.237*** -0.234 -0.157*** 7.776 -0.158*** -0.158*** 
  
  
  0.0488 0.0391 0.0389 0.0264 0 0.0177 53487 0.0203 0.0179 
  
  
Log (Exchange rate) -0.0365** -0.0481*** -0.0478*** -0.0229** -0.0221 -0.0174*** -0.996 -0.0177** -0.0176*** 
  
  
  0.0145 0.0119 0.0118 0.00887 0 0.00614 18595 0.00712 0.00626 
  
  
Log (Distance) 0.243*** 0.268*** 0.267*** 0.153*** 0.149 0.161*** 37.02 0.158*** 0.159*** 
  
   
0.0618 0.0428 0.0422 0.0352 0 0.0247 67000 0.029 0.0252 
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Firm controls 
Log (Sales) -0.175*** -0.0991*** -0.101*** 0.0212 -0.0065 
  
0.0440*** 0.0459*** 0.0415*** 
  
  0.0141 0.00994 0.00963 0.0224 0 
  
0.0145 0.0121 0.0116 
  
Log (Wage bill) 0.253*** 0.155*** 0.157*** -0.0462** -0.006 
  
-0.0831*** -0.0761*** -0.0769*** 
  
  0.0178 0.0126 0.0122 0.0192 0 
  
0.0207 0.0171 0.0167 
  
Fixed effects 
Product 
 
Yes 
          
Product#Year 
  
Yes 
   
Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm 
   
Yes 
        
Firm#Year 
    
Yes Yes Yes 
   
Yes Yes 
Product#Country 
     
Yes Yes 
    
Yes 
Country#Year 
      
Yes 
  
Yes Yes Yes 
Firm#Product 
       
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,420,470 2,385,387 2,385,387 2,385,387 2,385,387 1,835,213 1,831,631 2,385,387 1,843,038 1,842,993 3,210,254 3,210,254 
R-squared 0.058 0.463 0.476 0.255 0.267 0.776 0.782 0.815 0.776 0.779 0.804 0.804 
Note: The table explores the effect of the trading partner (import origin) country's corporate tax rate on the import price in related trades (between affiliates) relative to the effect on 
domestic and unaffiliated firms. The sample period is 2011 to 2015. A unit of observation is a firm-relation-origin-product-time quintuble. The dependent variable is the Log(Unit 
Value). The product is defined by HS8 codes. ‘Low tax partner’ is a dummy variable indicating whether the trading partner (import origin) country's corporate tax rate is below the 
South African corporate tax rate of 28 per cent. ‘Related party’ is a dummy variable indicating an internal (controlled) trade between affiliates of the same MNE. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at the country–year level. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on KPMG (n.d.), SARS (n.d.), and World Bank (n.d.). 
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Table A2d: Basic results with MNEs only & control for whether subsidiary is in country 
Dependent variable: Log (Unit Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Tax incentives in related transactions 
Related partner × low tax partner 0.287*** 0.171*** 0.167*** 0.0232 0.013 0.0215 0.0722*** 0.0707*** 0.0685*** 0.0757*** 0.0814*** 0.0814*** 
  0.0466 0.0395 0.0396 0.0255 0.0251 0.0173 0.0178 0.0244 0.0232 0.0207 0.0149 0.0149 
Related partner  -0.337 0.0283 0.131 -0.468 -0.354 0.376 0.225 0.0953 0.184 0.0868 0.294 0.294 
  1.111 0.835 0.845 0.605 0.592 0.356 0.385 0.439 0.419 0.419 0.287 0.287 
Pricing to market controls 
Related partner × ln (Population) 0.239*** 0.0624* 0.0631* 0.0465* 0.0496** 0.014 0.0304* 0.00285 0.00491 0.0222 0.0238* 0.0238* 
  0.0566 0.0342 0.0341 0.0253 0.0243 0.0192 0.0161 0.0202 0.0191 0.0174 0.0128 0.0128 
Related partner × ln (Ex. Rate) 0.0202 0.00402 0.0043 0.00398 0.00178 0.00436 -0.00157 0.00518 0.00512 0.00134 -0.00253 -0.00253 
  0.0201 0.0107 0.0106 0.00731 0.00672 0.0053 0.00447 0.00588 0.00551 0.00475 0.0035 0.0035 
Related partner × ln (GDP per capita) -0.172*** -0.0449 -0.0461 -0.0529* -0.0564** -0.0155 -0.0241 0.00359 0.000631 -0.015 -0.0144 -0.0144 
  0.0646 0.0406 0.0404 0.0301 0.0282 0.0209 0.019 0.0234 0.0219 0.0204 0.0157 0.0157 
Related partner × ln (Distance) 0.173 0.0468 0.0377 0.0978 0.0868 -0.00894 0.00174 -0.0118 -0.0177 0.00728 -0.0194 -0.0194 
  0.134 0.0985 0.0993 0.0813 0.0788 0.0437 0.0479 0.0523 0.0495 0.0501 0.0383 0.0383 
Non-related partner but subsidiary in 
country 
  
-0.0000907 0.0000147 -0.000000861 -0.000181*** -0.000177***        
0.0000832 0.000105 0.000105 0.0000638 0.0000539 
       
Subsidiary in country x low tax partner 0.0000911 -0.000490*** -0.000475*** 0.000118 0.000123 -0.000292*** -0.000211*** -0.000197** -0.000195** -0.000205*** -0.000178*** -0.000178*** 
  0.000206 0.000146 0.000147 0.000112 0.0000949 0.000073 0.0000572 0.0000971 0.000092 0.0000758 0.0000477 0.0000477 
Macro economic controls 
Low tax partner -0.433*** -0.189*** -0.190*** -0.105*** -0.105*** 
  
-0.0701*** -0.0705***       
  0.0649 0.0421 0.0423 0.0287 0.0285 
  
0.0197 0.0187       
Log (GDP per capita) 0.416*** 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.210*** 0.208*** 0.131*** 97.36 0.116*** 0.115***       
  0.0554 0.0275 0.0275 0.0217 0.0211 0.0163 464468 0.016 0.0149       
Log (Population) -0.520*** -0.314*** -0.315*** -0.226*** -0.224*** -0.158*** -50.76 -0.152*** -0.153***       
  0.0486 0.0284 0.0284 0.0197 0.0191 0.0166 444072 0.0151 0.0142       
Log (Exchange rate) -0.0465*** -0.0397*** -0.0392*** -0.0169** -0.0164** -0.0171*** 66.62 -0.0167*** -0.0166***       
  0.0169 0.01 0.0101 0.00762 0.00736 0.0053 456588 0.00555 0.00526       
Log (Distance) 0.245*** 0.194*** 0.190*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.139*** 552.2 0.153*** 0.153***       
 0.0648 0.0278 0.0277 0.0276 0.0271 0.017 1860000 0.0187 0.0174       
  
36 
Firm controls 
Log (Sales) -0.140*** -0.0564*** -0.0580*** 0.0261    0.0261* 0.0285* 0.0196   
  0.0078 0.00805 0.00808 0.0263    0.0154 0.0154 0.0133   
Log (Wage bill) 0.207*** 0.101*** 0.103*** 0.0113    -0.00507 0.000344 0.0000289   
  0.0109 0.00739 0.00736 0.0202    0.0168 0.0172 0.0172   
Fixed effects 
Product  Yes           
Product#Year   Yes    Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm    Yes         
Firm#Year     Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes 
Product#Country      Yes Yes     Yes 
Country#Year       Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Firm#Product        Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,445,511 631,291 631,291 631,291 631,291 564,400 560,334 631,291 560,527 560,451 819,905 819,905 
R-squared 0.083 0.438 0.453 0.214 0.225 0.735 0.742 0.77 0.734 0.737 0.746 0.746 
Note: The table explores the effect of the trading partner (import origin) country's corporate tax rate on the import price in related trades (between affiliates) relative to the effect 
on domestic and unaffiliated firms. The sample period is 2011 to 2015. A unit of observation is a firm-relation-origin-product-time quintuble. The dependent variable is the Log 
(Unit Value). The product is defined by HS8 codes. ‘Low tax partner’ is a dummy variable indicating whether the trading partner (import origin) country's corporate tax rate is 
below the South African corporate tax rate of 28 per cent. ‘Related partner’ is a dummy variable indicating an internal (controlled) trade between affiliates of the same MNE. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at the country–year level. 
Author’s calculations based on KPMG (n.d.), SARS (n.d.), and World Bank (n.d.). 
 
